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Summary
The science and research community is understandably concerned about the implications 
and opportunities of the UK leaving the European Union. The Government has provided 
some helpful and welcome short-term reassurances in relation to underwriting EU 
funding for research and maintaing access to student loans, but the Government’s 
strategy for communicating these recent announcements is insufficient. Speeches and 
high-level meetings with stakeholder representatives will not be enough to ensure that 
messages are received at all levels and by audiences around the world.
The consequences and opportunities for science and research of wider decisions relating 
to the UK’s new relationships with the EU need to be fully fed into Government at the 
highest levels. The Government is meeting with stakeholders and assembling a high level 
forum on science and research, but we are not convinced that the needs of science and 
research are at the heart of the Department for Exiting the European Union’s (DExEU) 
thinking and planning for Brexit. Science should have a strong voice as part of the 
negotiations. DExEU needs a Chief Scientific Adviser urgently. The Government should 
also involve the interim Chair of UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) as a bridge 
between the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and DExEU.
Planning for exit negotiations is still underway, and there remains uncertainty about 
the future model of the relationship we will have with the EU. Nevertheless, the 
Government should now act to reduce uncertainty by setting out a vision for science. 
This should include commitments to raise science expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
(as we have previously urged).
It should also include measures to attract skilled researchers and students, to be taken 
forward in Brexit negotiations separately from immigration controls more broadly, and 
should include an immediate commitment to exempt EU researchers already working 
here from any wider potential immigration controls.
The Government must also seek to capitalise on the opportunities of Brexit, including in 
terms of setting regulations to facilitate accessing markets and research collaborations 
beyond the EU.
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1 Introduction
1. The House of Lords Science & Technology Committee noted in April 2016 that the 
UK’s membership of the European Union has a “wide-ranging influence” on UK science 
and research:
The UK’s level of engagement with EU funding programmes, for instance, 
is considerable. EU membership also has significant bearing on scientific 
collaborations, the mobility of researchers, regulatory frameworks and 
research and development (R&D) undertaken by businesses, to highlight 
just some of the interactions between EU membership and the vitality, or 
otherwise, of science and research in the UK.1
2. Before the EU Referendum, we reported specifically on the EU regulation of the life 
sciences, noting that the impact of the European Union in this area can be assessed in 
terms of “the balance between the benefits of harmonised and responsive regulation and 
the compromises needed to achieve this”. We concluded that “too often, the precautionary 
principle has been wilfully misused in the formulation of EU life science policy-making”, 
and that “whatever the outcome of the Referendum, it will be necessary to reduce large 
areas of unnecessary complexity and overlap in EU regulation”.2 We noted that the UK was 
a significant net financial contributor to the EU overall, but a net receiver of EU funding 
for research,3 and that “if, despite the clear attractiveness of the UK as a research location, 
EU research funding was withdrawn after the exit negotiations, new funding could come 
from research collaborations outside the EU and from the Treasury reallocating funds 
previously sent to the EU”.4 We also concluded that “under current arrangements, the UK 
benefits significantly from access to EU science research budgets” and that “the EU can 
be an enabler of collaboration among member states, not least in the area of clinical trials: 
here, robust conclusions require large cohorts which cooperation between member states 
can provide”.5
3. On 23 June the UK voted to leave the European Union. We launched our current 
inquiry on 28 June, seeking written evidence on the following points:
• What the effect of the various models available for the UK’s future relationship 
with the EU will be on UK science and research, in terms of: collaboration; free 
movement of researchers and students; access to funding; access to EU-funded 
research facilities, both in the UK and abroad; and intellectual property and 
commercialisation of research.
• What the science and research priorities for the UK Government should be in 
negotiating a new relationship with the EU.
1 House of Lords, EU membership and UK science, Second report of the Science and Technology Committee, 
Session 2015–16, HL Paper 127, para 2
2 Science and Technology Committee, First Report of Session 2016–17, EU regulation of the life sciences, HC 158, 
para 17
3 Science and Technology Committee, First Report of Session 2016–17, EU regulation of the life sciences, HC 158, 
para 3
4 Science and Technology Committee, First Report of Session 2016–17, EU regulation of the life sciences, HC 158, 
para 4
5 Science and Technology Committee, First Report of Session 2016–17, EU regulation of the life sciences, HC 158, 
pp3–4
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• What science and technology-related legislation, regulations and projects will 
need to be reviewed in the run up to the UK leaving the EU.
• The status of researchers, scientists and students working and studying in the 
UK when the UK leaves the EU, and what protections should be put in place for 
them.
• The opportunities that the UK’s exit presents for research collaboration and 
market access with non-EU countries, and how these might compare with 
existing EU arrangements.
• What other measures the Government should undertake to keep UK science 
and research on a sound footing, with sufficient funding, after an EU exit.
In July we issued a supplementary call for submissions in the format of a ‘risk assessment’, to 
address risks and opportunities in terms of their causes, consequences, impact, mitigation 
and ways in which the effects could be measured.
4. We held oral evidence sessions in June and July, hearing from a range of witnesses 
including the Minister for Universities, Science, Research and Innovation (Jo Johnson 
MP). By September we had received over 270 written submissions, including from over 
40 universities, from higher education groups, businesses and learned societies. We also 
received many submissions from researchers and students, both on an individual basis 
and acting collectively as departments or interest groups. Several of the submissions were 
in a ‘risk assessment’ format. We are grateful to everyone who provided evidence.
5. We completed our inquiry with a final evidence session in October, with the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Department for Exiting the European 
Union (Robin Walker MP), alongside the Science Minister. This provided an opportunity 
to explore more recent developments, including government announcements in relation 
to support for research and the creation of the new Department for Exiting the European 
Union (DExEU).
6. Our inquiry builds on a considerable body of previous analysis. Given the wealth of 
detailed information available elsewhere, our report focuses specifically on the actions 
that the Government has taken in this area since June (Chapter 2), and the overarching 
priorities that the Government will need to consider when framing its Brexit negotiation 
position if it is to secure a positive outcome for science and research from leaving the EU 
(Chapter 3). In Chapter 4 we discuss the need for a new vision for science and research 
in the context of Brexit, and the extent to which structures are in place to ensure that the 
‘voice’ of science and research is fed into DExEU.
7. Our report addresses the high-level issues of funding, people, collaboration, regulation, 
innovation and infrastructure. An Annex to our report summarises supporting material 
under those headings from the many written submissions we received. We intend to 
monitor and continue to scrutinise the Government’s approach to negotiating Brexit and 
how this addresses the particular risks and opportunities for science and research as the 
process continues over the months and years ahead.
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2 Short-term responses to uncertainty
8. As Innovate UK told us during our Science Budget inquiry:
The strength of our globally respected research base is an unparalleled 
strategic asset for the UK and we must continue to invest in it. With 0.9% 
of the world’s population, and 3.2% of its R&D spend, we produce 15.9% 
of its most important research output. The UK is home to 4 of the top 
6 universities in the world. The output of this engine of new knowledge 
discovery is a constant source of potential commercial advantage.6
Any discussion of the risks and opportunities for science and research of leaving the EU 
must begin with this as its starting point—UK science and research is a national asset that 
can either be nurtured and strengthened by appropriate stewardship and vision, or be 
compromised by neglect during the UK’s exit from the EU.
The Government’s initial reassurances
9. After the Referendum the Government moved quickly to provide initial reassurances 
to the sector that “nothing changed overnight” in terms of the UK’s rights and obligations 
as a member of the EU.7 In a speech at the Wellcome Trust on 30 June, the Science 
Minister said it was “business as usual” for UK researchers and businesses applying for 
EU funding through the ‘Horizon 2020’ Framework Programme,8 which the European 
Commission told us provided €1.2 billion to UK-based organisations for research project 
bids submitted in 2015 (16% of the total funding allocated in that period).9 The minister 
also confirmed that EU students currently studying in the UK or beginning their studies 
in the autumn would remain eligible for student finance throughout the duration of their 
courses, and it was subsequently announced that this would also apply to those starting 
courses in the 2017/18 academic year.10
10. Despite these statements, we heard over the summer from several universities that 
there were concerns that funding bids involving UK partners might now be looked upon 
less favourably in the EU’s research funding review process. Bias within the evaluation 
process is a theoretical possibility at least, because Horizon 2020 proposals are not judged 
‘blind’—the identity and location of partners is known.11 Nevertheless, the European 
Commission assured us that “experts are briefed to evaluate proposals with United 
Kingdom-based participants without taking into consideration any speculation on the 
consequences for the Horizon 2020 action of a withdrawal of the United Kingdom from 
the EU”.12 In July, Carlos Moedas, the EU Commissioner for Research, Science and 
Innovation, told the EuroScience Open Forum in Manchester that “Horizon 2020 projects 
will continue to be evaluated based on merit and not on nationality”.13
6 Science and Technology Committee, First Report of Session 2015–16, The science budget, HC 340, para 1
7 Speech by Jo Johnson MP at the Wellcome Trust 30 June 2016, Leading the world in a new age of global science
8 Speech by Jo Johnson MP at the Wellcome Trust 30 June 2016, Leading the world in a new age of global science
9 European Commission (LEA 287)
10 “Funding support for EU students”, Department for Education press release, 11 October 2016
11 European Commission (LEA 287)
12 European Commission (LEA 287)
13 “Europe’s voyage towards an open global research area”, Carlos Moedas, European Commission, 25 July 2016
7 Leaving the EU: implications and opportunities for science and research 
11. There was also concern that collaborators would pressure UK researchers to withdraw 
from multi-national research projects. We received examples of this happening. For 
instance, the University of Liverpool told us that it was “aware of five instances where 
Liverpool researchers have had to surrender the lead partner role in a current Horizon 
2020 consortium under preparation due to partner pressure”.14 Scientists for EU collected 
40 examples of “Horizon 2020 disruption”, including UK partners stepping down from 
a coordinating role or being asked not to take part in a consortium.15 In our separate 
inquiry into Regenerative medicine, Ian Trenholm, the Chief Executive of NHS Blood & 
Transplant, told us that his organisation’s researchers have been asked “Who is going to lead 
the group? Well, it can’t be you because you are the British people”.16 Jo Johnson told us that 
132 emails had been received in response to a request from the Department for Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) for evidence of the impact of Brexit on research 
programmes, and that two-thirds of these related to funding issues (although these may 
overlap with the earlier examples submitted to Scientists for EU).17 In response to such 
concerns, Commissioner Moedas urged the European scientific community “to continue 
to choose their project partners on the basis of excellence”,18 and BEIS corresponded with 
those who provided examples of being asked to withdraw from research consortia.19
12. We also heard, however, that there could be other cases where UK partners were 
simply not invited to join a research consortium in the first place. As Joe Gorman—a UK 
researcher based in Norway—put it, “if you are not invited to the party you don’t even 
know there is a party”.20 Jo Johnson agreed that this effect could be difficult to monitor:
It may be, as many have led us to understand, that this is not something that 
we will actually ever find; by its nature, you might not understand when an 
institution has not received a call because they are a UK institution. It is 
harder to get data on that sort of phenomenon. We have not received any 
really significant concrete evidence of discrimination at this point, but we 
are very vigilant and we are not complacent about that.21
Treasury guarantees
13. On 12 August the Chief Secretary to the Treasury announced a range of further 
assurances in relation to the EU funding that the UK currently receives.22 On European 
Structural Investment Funds (ESIF), the Treasury stated that “all multi-year projects 
administered by government with signed contracts or funding agreements in place, and 
projects to be signed in the ordinary course of business before the Autumn Statement, 
will be fully funded, even when these projects continue beyond the UK’s departure from 
the EU”. The Treasury’s announcement also explained that in the medium term “the 
14 University of Liverpool (LEA 222) para 14. Similarly, the University of Leicester (LEA 179) para 3, told us it was 
aware of seven cases “either of research consortia breaking up, or researchers being unwilling to submit 
bids including British researchers”. Keele University (LEA 213) para 13 provided a named example of this, and 
Sheffield Hallam University (LEA 90) para 18 told us it was aware of three examples.
15 Scientists for EU (LEA 261)
16 Oral evidence taken on 19 October 2016, HC 275, Q189
17 Q190
18 “Europe’s voyage towards an open global research area”, Carlos Moedas, European Commission, 25 July 2016
19 Q190
20 Joe Gorman (LEA 75)
21 Q191
22 Letter from the Chief Secretary to the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union on EU funding, 12 
August 2016
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Treasury will work with departments, Local Enterprise Partnerships and other relevant 
stakeholders to put in place arrangements for considering those ESIF projects that might 
be signed after the Autumn Statement but while we still remain a member of the EU”.23
14. Scientists for EU queried how projects agreed after the Autumn Statement will be 
reviewed:
Given that we are still in the EU and playing by EU rules for this period, 
it begs the question of why we would suddenly need this extra layer of 
national bureaucracy. It is not clear who will make these assessments and 
what will be the success rates. This poses a new risk as potential applicants 
may wonder how long approvals will take and whether it is worthwhile 
developing ERDF [a component of ESIF] proposals.
15. For other funding, including Horizon 2020, the Autumn Statement cut-off does not 
apply.24 The Treasury Minister stated that:
The Treasury will underwrite the payment of such awards, even when 
specific projects continue beyond the UK’s departure from the EU. The UK 
will continue to be a world leader in international research and innovation 
collaboration, and we expect to ensure that close collaboration between the 
UK and the EU in science continues.
16. This announcement was welcomed by many groups. The University of Portsmouth 
explained that its Institute of Cosmology and Gravitation currently had two large 
European Research Council grants running to 2019 and 2020, and that “the Government 
announcement offers these projects, and the staff employed on them, valuable assurances 
about their research”.25
17. We asked the Treasury about how the decision to underwrite EU funds was taken, 
and what level of financial commitment it involved. They explained that:
The EU budget operates a dual budgeting system of legal “commitments” 
(in which the Commission signs a contract to pay the recipient funding, 
subject to meeting the funding criteria) and “payments” in which the 
funding is finally paid. Payments relate to a specific commitment and can 
be made several years after the commitment is made. A payment is only 
made when the recipient of the funding has met certain expectations under 
the terms of the funding agreement.
HM Treasury’s funding guarantee relates to the value of payments still to be 
made after the UK has left the EU for which there has been a commitment 
while the UK is still a member […] It is not yet possible to say how many of 
these outstanding payments the UK will need to supplement, on departure 
from the European Union. This will ultimately depend on agreement 
reached in exit negotiations following the Article 50 process.26
23 Letter from the Chief Secretary to the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union on EU funding, 12 
August 2016
24 Q170
25 University of Portsmouth (LEA 251)
26 HM Treasury (LEA 286)
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18. We asked Jo Johnson whether it was likely that the Treasury would actually need to 
step in to make these payments, given that they are based on the EU’s “legal commitments”. 
He told us that “there was strong demand from the stakeholder community for this 
reassurance,”27 and noted that “irrespective of whether it is required or not, it is there”.28 
Robin Walker MP, a DExEU minister, added that:
One of the real benefits of the Treasury guarantees […] is that it sends the 
message to firms, to universities and to others to keep on bidding [...] The 
Article 50 process will take some time, and during that time we will be 
paying into the EU budgets. It is very important that we get out the value that 
we are due and that we continue to meet all our rights and responsibilities 
through that time.29
19. Jo Johnson also assured us that if expenditure were required to meet this guarantee, 
this would be “new, additional money beyond the £26.3 billion that the Government have 
already committed to science for the [Spending Review] period in question”,30 but was not 
able to tell us how much money this was expected to be:
We do not know whether there will be any shortfall, but there will be no 
dipping into the [science budget] ring fence. That is the commitment that 
has been made to the community.31
20. The Government has provided helpful reassurance to the science and research 
community by promising to underwrite the payment of EU grants extending 
beyond the point at which the UK leaves the European Union. However welcome this 
announcement is, it does not appear to represent a significant new financial investment, 
given that the EU itself apparently has a legal commitment to honour these payments. 
In Chapter 4 we note that the forthcoming Autumn Statement provides an important 
opportunity for the Government to demonstrate its commitment to making science and 
research a lynchpin of our economy after Brexit by taking steps towards increasing science 
spending as we have previously urged.
Communication strategy
21. Jo Johnson told us that the Government was “out of the traps extremely early, providing 
initial reassurance to the sector”, but acknowledged in July that “it is not enough just to 
put out a couple of initial statements. We realise we have to keep going and make sure that 
we continually reinforce the positive messages that we have started sending out”.32 He told 
us then that the Government wanted to put in place:
a comprehensive communications strategy to send out those kinds of 
message around the world—that we are more open and outward-looking 
27 Q174
28 Q176
29 Q204
30 Q180
31 Q203
32 Q129
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than ever before, and that we want to forge international collaborations 
with European partners and countries beyond the European Union, now 
more than ever.33
22. In October we asked the Science Minister to update us on this communications strategy. 
He told us that there had been “public official communications that have been aiming 
to provide important reassurances on key areas of uncertainty”, citing announcements 
relating to loans and fees for EU students and the Treasury’s guarantees on payment of EU 
funding as “the key detailed crunchy elements of our comms strategy”.34 Alongside these, 
the Minister highlighted a “drumbeat of reassuring speeches” from Ministers “around 
the importance that we attach to our ability to continue to attract talent from around the 
world to sustain our science base”.35 He told us that he had held roundtable meetings with 
community representatives, including the university mission groups, to “reassure them 
that we are on the case, listening to their concerns and trying wherever we can to address 
them”.36
23. However, when we asked whether these messages were filtering down through the 
system following high-level meetings, he told us that “it is up to those representative bodies 
to decide how they communicate with their members. I imagine that they do”.37 We were 
also concerned by comments in the media that a “Government source” had described 
a recent report from the life sciences community as “basically the industry whining 
about Brexit, and it was not very constructive and has gone straight into the hopper”.38 Jo 
Johnson told us that he did not recognise this quote.39
24. The level of interest in our call for evidence—both in scale and the variety of 
organisations and individuals responding—demonstrates that there are many different 
audiences for a Government communications strategy, both at home and around the world. 
It is disappointing that this was not reflected in the Government’s oral evidence to us. 
There is more to be done to spread the messages of recent Government announcements 
before the communications strategy can be described as ‘comprehensive’. In this 
context, the communication of the policy is as important as the policy itself.
25. In the light of continuing uncertainty about the risks and opportunities for 
science following exit from the EU it is vital that the Government has a comprehensive 
communications strategy for this critical area. At the heart of such a strategy should 
be a clear understanding of the different audiences with which the Government 
should communicate, their existing levels of understanding, and the different forms 
of communication that will be most effective for each group.
26. We recommend that the Government present to us a genuinely comprehensive 
strategy for communicating its messages of ongoing support for science and research in 
the context of its plans for leaving the EU and the negotiations to follow. The strategy 
33 Q119
34 Q200
35 Q200
36 Q200
37 Q201
38 “Ministers snub life sciences industry’s report on Brexit”, Daily Telegraph, 22 October 2016
39 Q196
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should be much more than a collection of high-level meetings and speeches within 
the UK, and should include an analysis of key audiences in other countries, such as 
researchers who could be encouraged to work here.
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3 Securing the best outcome for science 
and research from the Brexit process
What matters most to science and research?
27. It was clear from the written evidence we received that the science community’s 
hopes and fears for the future revolve around five key issues:
• Funding—in particular the need either to secure ongoing access to sources such 
as the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme and its successors (as called for by 
over 38,000 signatories to a parliament e-petition),40 or to develop appropriate 
domestic funding mechanisms at a similar level if access cannot be negotiated. 
It was suggested that there was a need to map the complex EU funding 
environment,41 and a need to understand current ‘exposure’ to changes in EU 
funding by subject and university.42
• People—specifically the attractiveness of the UK to EU researchers (as well as 
those further afield) as a place to live, work and study, and the need to provide 
guarantees for those already working here (see below). We also heard that there 
were opportunities for improving the support the current visa system provides 
for short-term visits, and a particular interest in maintaining participation in 
the ERASMUS study abroad programme.43
• Collaboration, leadership and influence—for UK researchers to be part of multi-
national projects, since “science is a global enterprise”,44 and to continue to 
influence the EU’s research agenda and strategic direction.
• Regulation—ensuring that those regulations which facilitate research 
collaboration and access to the EU market for life science and other research 
outputs are retained, and those which hinder innovation are revised. And taking 
advantage of opportunities to set regulations which facilitate collaborations and 
trade beyond the EU. We also heard particular concerns about the implications 
for medicines licensed through the European Medicines Agency and whether 
Brexit could lead to delays in patients accessing novel treatments.45
• Facilities—concerns about the ability of UK researchers to continue to access 
EU research facilities in other countries, and the need to protect the future of 
those that are currently hosted in the UK. We were told, however, that “they all 
have different legal bases […] A very complex and variable geometry sits behind 
these relationships”.46
40 Petition, “We require any Brexit deal preserves access to EU collaborative R&D programmes”, accessed 9 
November 2016
41 Scientists for EU (LEA 261)
42 Royal Academy of Engineering (LEA 279) para 2.7. Some information by discipline was provided by Research 
Councils UK (LEA 235) Annex 1
43 See for instance Universities UK (LEA 275), Russell Group (LEA 180) para 3.6, Loughborough University (LEA 109) 
para 2.4
44 Royal Society (LEA 177) para 3
45 Association of Medical Research Charities (LEA 228). See also our report on EU regulation of the life sciences 
(footnote 2).
46 Q206 [Gareth Davies]
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Further detail on each of these issues is included in the Annex to this report, providing an 
agenda which the Government can use to explore them in greater depth.
28. We also heard that many of the priority issues for the science community are 
interlinked. As Professor Ian Diamond Chair of the Universities UK Policy Network, 
explained:
there is no point having a regulatory framework if you do not have the 
talent; there is no point having the talent if you do not have access to the 
grants.47
The Campaign for Science and Engineering wrote that “part of ensuring that the UK is a 
destination of choice for scientists of all nationalities (including British nationals) to build 
a career is to ensure this is a place where they can participate in the best science. Access 
and retention of talent therefore cannot be divorced from access to funding, regulation 
and ability to collaborate with the rest of the world, including Europe”.48 Kevin Baughan, 
Chief Development Officer at Innovate UK, told us:
We cannot really look at each of those parts individually. We need a strategy 
and a plan that allows us to move the whole ecosystem forward, because 
together they take worldclass science and turn it into jobs and growth; and 
together they allow businesses to export, to compete in wider markets and 
to build broader partnerships.49
29. The Government will need to address all of the priority issues for the science 
community listed in this report—funding, people, collaboration, regulation and 
facilities—as a coherent whole rather than a list of separate considerations.
People
30. Witnesses emphasised the importance of people in the context of science and research, 
in particular the future mobility of researchers and the uncertainty faced by those already 
in the UK.
Movement of researchers
31. Our counterparts in the House of Lords concluded before the Referendum that 
researcher mobility was “of critical importance to the UK science community, including 
academia, business and charities”, and that “researcher mobility must be protected if UK 
science and research is to remain world-leading”.50 Similarly, the Francis Crick Institute 
told us that international scientific talent was “the lifeblood” of the Institute, and was 
typical of many of our written submissions when they emphasised that “high quality 
science needs the very best minds, both from the UK and around the world […] We must 
be able to recruit and retain the very best scientists, whatever country they come from”.51
47 Q6
48 Campaign for Science and Engineering (LEA 267)
49 Q86
50 House of Lords, EU membership and UK science, Second report of the Science and Technology Committee, 
Session 2015–16, HL Paper 127, para 171
51 Francis Crick Institute (LEA 146) para 2.3
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32. Professor Philip Nelson of Research Councils UK told us that “the biggest risks to the 
research base in the UK are around the people involved”.52 We received written examples 
of researchers considering rejecting UK job offers and citing the Referendum result as the 
reason.53 Dr Sarah Main of the Campaign for Science and Engineering (CaSE) effectively 
summarised much of our evidence:
It is not really a question of us allowing talented scientists and engineers 
to come here; it is about us fighting for them to come here. There is an 
international competitive market for these fantastically talented people […] 
The UK Government can make a great contribution by stating extremely 
clearly, one, what its priority is for the place of science in our future, 
whether it wants the UK to remain a scientific superpower, for it to lead on 
its scientific strength and heritage, and, two, how it feels about the people 
that it wants to come here, because all of those wonderful achievements that 
we can all cite about the UK are done by people from a range of nationalities 
in this country. UK science is not done by UK nationals. It is done by many 
people.54
33. It remains to be seen whether the Government will seek to apply existing controls on 
non-EU citizens to EU citizens or to introduce a new system, and the extent to which any 
controls include a ‘points-based’ or ‘employer-led selection’ system. Other countries have 
developed immigration systems which have to varying degrees adopted—like the UK—a 
hybrid mix of such approaches, including Australia and Canada which had been the focus 
of debate in the Referendum.55 In September, the Prime Minister was reported as casting 
doubt on the scope for a points-based system when she said that “What the British people 
voted for on 23 June was to bring some control into the movement of people from the 
European Union to the UK: A points-based system does not give you that control.”56
34. Dr Main from CaSE called for the dialogue on migration to become more “nuanced”, 
arguing that “it would be a mistake to interpret the leave vote as a blanket mandate to reduce 
immigration. There is nuance—and it needs to be drawn out in the public dialogue—
by occupation and by contributions to the economy”. Professor Angus Dalgleish from 
Scientists for Britain made a similar point:
There is a massive difference between the freedom of movement of people 
and the freedom of movement of skilled labour. […] The freedom of 
movement of people is not on; it is freedom of skilled labour that we want 
to maintain.
This is reflected in post-referendum polling conducted for the think tank British Future, 
which found that:
Only 12% of people, for instance, would like to see a reduction in the 
numbers of skilled workers coming to Britain; nearly four times as many 
people (46%) would like to see more of it, with 42% saying that it should stay 
52 Q84
53 See for instance Professor Jonathan Bamber (LEA 41)
54 Q39
55 The UK’s points-based system for immigration, Briefing paper 7662, House of Commons Library, July 2016
56 “No 10 rules out points-based immigration system for Britain”, The Guardian, 5 September 2016
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the same. Among people who voted Leave in the referendum these numbers 
remain broadly the same: 45% would like to see an increase, just 15% a 
reduction and 40% say that the numbers should stay as they are.
The same is true of international students coming to study at Britain’s 
universities, who made up over a quarter of immigration flows to the 
UK last year. Only a fifth of people (22%) would like these numbers to be 
reduced, less than the 24% who would be happy for them to go up. The 
majority (54%, including 50% of Leave voters) would rather the numbers 
stayed the same.57
35. Professor Dalgleish argued that controls on immigration and attracting research 
talent were not mutually exclusive, citing Canada and Australia as examples of countries 
that “operate very strict point limitations” but “do not have any trouble attracting the best 
scientists in the world to them”. Scientists for Britain later wrote that
science is now so globalised that borders are less of a barrier to talented 
researchers wishing to live, work and collaborate with colleagues around 
the world, and as such, we would argue that UK science would still be able 
to excel in the event that ‘the single market and associated free movement’ 
is not the outcome of exit negotiations. We would, however, urge our own 
government to recognise the importance or researcher mobility to science, 
and recommend that any future arrangements should ensure that scientists 
and students from around the world are still encouraged to visit, study and 
work in the UK.58
36. Given that there was such agreement on this between groups who campaigned 
previously on opposite sides of the referendum debate, we asked Robin Walker whether 
the Government could commit to ensuring appropriate researcher mobility. He told us 
that:
We want to create an immigration system that allows us to exert control, 
which people have asked for, over the overall numbers, but also to encourage 
the brightest and the best to come here […] Our job is to conduct the 
negotiations in a way that gives the UK the powers to control the system 
going forward, but within that we absolutely recognise the need to continue 
to attract talent and the value that people in the research community bring 
to our country”.59
37. We understand that the Government is not yet able to offer firmer guarantees 
regarding future immigration rules for researchers but remind them that this is 
essential in order to continue to attract top-quality researchers to the UK. We recognise 
that planning for exit negotiations is still underway, but there is clear agreement that 
researcher mobility is a crucial component of the UK’s successful research and science 
sector. The issue should be treated separately from discussions about immigration 
control more broadly, with firm commitments provided as soon as possible.
57 British Future, What next after Brexit? Immigration and integration in post-referendum Britain, August 2016, 
p10
58 Scientists for Britain (LEA 89)
59 Q181
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Certainty for existing EU research staff
38. A common theme in our evidence was that reassurances to EU researchers already 
working in the UK would be needed in order to avoid a ‘brain drain’. We received 
submissions from individual researchers who told us they were “seriously considering” 
leaving the UK,60 and a group of postdoctoral researchers told us that 18% of them were 
now actively seeking jobs in other countries.61 Professor Ottoline Leyser, representing 
the Royal Society, noted that there were 31,000 nonUK EU citizens working in research 
in academia in the UK, and believed that “those people are all feeling very anxious and 
unwelcome”:
There has been a lot of discussion about nonUK EU nationals currently 
working in the UK and what guarantees can be provided to them. […] I 
think it is absolutely not the way we should be proceeding—to use people’s 
lives as bargaining chips in a broader political landscape. I do not think that 
is a constructive way to arrive at a negotiation table either.62
39. The Prime Minister wrote to Sir Paul Nurse following the Referendum acknowledging 
that:
Our research base is enriched by the best minds from Europe and around the 
world—providing reassurance to these individuals and to UK researchers 
working in Europe will be a priority for the Government.63
40. The Government should deliver on the Prime Minister’s early reassurance to EU 
researchers currently working in the UK, that certainty for them will be a Government 
priority, by making an immediate commitment to exempt them from Brexit negotiations 
on any reciprocal immigration controls for workers already in post.
The scope for a bespoke model
41. The House of Lords Science and Technology Committee’s report in April explained 
that a several pre-existing Brexit ‘models’ exist, some of which allow non-EU members to 
continue to benefit from EU funding streams.64 These models are based on the precedents 
that other countries have established. The models have differing requirements in relation 
to free movement, access to markets, the ability to influence EU science programmes 
and to benefit from their funding—existing models involve some trade-off between such 
benefits and a range of rights and obligations.
42. Switzerland is an example of a country that is not a Member State, nor a member of 
the European Economic Area; it is, however, an Associated Country and a participant in 
the single market. Switzerland participates in the EU’s fundamental principle of freedom 
of movement via a bilateral agreement. However, while Switzerland currently participates 
in Horizon 2020, it will lose its current membership from 2017 unless it resolves a 
disagreement with the EU over freedom of movement, arising from a referendum vote to 
60 Professor David Dobson (LEA 29); see also Professor Frank Krauss (LEA 23), Professor Carlton Baugh (LEA 6)
61 UCL Institute of Neurology Postdoc Committee (LEA 28)
62 Q79
63 Letter from the Prime Minister to Sir Paul Nurse, 18 July 2016
64 House of Lords, EU membership and UK science, Second report of the Science and Technology Committee, 
Session 2015–16, HL Paper 127, para 225–235
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limit immigration and prioritise Swiss nationals for jobs. Given this history and ongoing 
negotiations, we asked Professor Martin Vetterli, President of the National Research 
Council of the Swiss National Science Foundation, if there were any pitfalls that the UK 
science community and its negotiators should be aware of when seeking a good deal for 
science. He warned that:
At least the Swiss tried to avoid the sin of arrogance. Even though Swiss 
science is very good, that is not how we went to Brussels.
43. Professor Dalgleish from Scientists for Britain was confident that the UK could 
develop its own model:
There are three or four models, and one of them people can fit into and 
have all the same privileges as everybody else without being a member of 
the European Union. I personally think that Britain and its science is so big 
that it will probably warrant its own model in that regard. […] The UK is 
far too important to fit into an ordinary model […] we should basically be 
able to craft our own model, because, as is rightly said, we are the leaders.65
44. Professor Ian Diamond also argued that the UK needed “an enhanced model to those 
that exist at the moment”. He suggested that an arrangement on more favourable terms 
than Norway (an Associated Country) could be achieved given the significance of UK 
science to Europe:
I am not completely convinced that European science would have the 
vision, the drive and the imagination without Britain at the table […] it is 
incredibly important that we maintain a model that enables us to be able to 
influence as well as to receive […] We certainly need a model that is similar 
to those of the associate countries at the moment, but, in addition, I believe 
very strongly that we need to make sure that we have some influence over 
the future direction of European science.66
45. Jo Johnson told us in July that it was too early for the Government to set out which 
model it wanted to pursue:
It would be premature for me to alight on a particular structure, because we 
are at an early stage today. […] Obviously, science is an extremely important 
national interest but there are many others that will be taken into account 
in determining our answers to these questions. There is a spectrum of 
relationships in the Horizon 2020 programme […] We are a very big science 
power, we are a very big economy, but it is not for me now to define before 
this Committee what our eventual negotiating position might be, because it 
is going to take us some time to get to that answer.67
65 Q9
66 Q8
67 Q134
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Opportunities
46. Jo Johnson emphasised that the development of the Government’s post-Brexit 
industrial strategy provided fresh opportunities for science:
The Industrial Strategy presents an enormous opportunity for science and 
innovation in this country. We are very clear that we want science and 
innovation to be at the very heart of industrial strategy, as a means for us 
to improve our economic performance and make this a country that works 
for everyone.68
47. Our written evidence highlighted other particular areas of opportunity where the 
Government might seek to maximise the benefits for science and research that leaving the 
EU could bring. We discuss these below. Others were discussed in the ‘risk assessment’ 
submissions we received.69
Revising VAT rules to stimulate university-business collaboration
48. The Campaign for Science and Engineering (CaSE) drew our attention to an 
opportunity to support business-university research collaboration through a change to 
VAT rules, as recommended by the Dowling Review.70 CaSE explained that:
The primary issue is that publicly-funded research institutes are restricted 
to 5% commercial activity if they opt not to pay VAT or face costly tax bills 
to co-locate their researchers with industry colleagues.71
We heard from UCL that “previous explanations for this state of affairs have been the 
requirements to comply with EU legislation […] The UK’s withdrawal from the EU 
therefore poses an important opportunity for the Government to address this issue […] 
The Government could also consider introducing additional incentives to actively promote 
university-business co-location”.72
Regulatory reform
49. Several witness highlighted the opportunity for the UK to “create a distinctive, 
attractive environment for research and innovation”73 and become “a global leader in 
scientific regulation”.74 UCL also suggested that discussion on how regulation could be 
changed to enable scientific progress “could be conducted in such a way to make the UK 
an exemplar for public dialogue and engagement with science”.75
50. In our EU regulation of the life sciences report, we noted that there were areas 
where the EU should improve the regulation system, including “its complexity and cost, 
68 Q188
69 See for instance UCL (LEA 258), the Association of Medical Research Charities (LEA 228), the University of Bristol 
(LEA 210)
70 Professor Dame Anne Dowling, The Dowling Review of business-university research collaborations, July 2015, 
para 78
71 Campaign for Science and Engineering (LEA 267)
72 UCL (LEA 258) para 49–51. See also Cancer Research UK (LEA 224)
73 Campaign for Science and Engineering (LEA 267)
74 UCL (LEA 258) para 52
75 UCL (LEA 258) para 53
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its timeliness, its application of the precautionary principle and its consistency”. We 
highlighted the particular examples of GM and clinical trials regulation. Nevertheless, we 
were also reminded in that inquiry that there was a need to balance the opportunity for 
reform with the benefits that consistency in regulation bring. As we concluded previously:
By harmonising the procedures under which research is conducted, EU 
regulation can foster crossborder collaborations. These multiple state 
collaborations are evident at least in the conduct of clinical trials, for 
example, and setting up such trials through a system where permission 
needed to be sought country by country would likely introduce even more 
delay and bureaucracy than the current EU system.76
51. In our current inquiry, Stuart Pritchard from the Wellcome Trust highlighted the issue 
of EU regulations beyond the life sciences that are in the process of being implemented, 
and that there was a risk of “legislative limbo”:
The data protection regulation […] is not currently on the statute in the 
UK. It is in the process of being transposed. If we were to have a different 
set of regulations from those in the EU, it may well prevent us being able to 
participate in largescale health data research projects, for example, and that 
would extremely limit the work that the Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute 
in Cambridgeshire does as the largest genomics institute in Europe. […] 
In terms of EU regulation, it is very much a scalpel rather than a sword 
that we need to have, in terms of unpicking where the UK should retain 
EU regulation and where there might be the need for change. One key area 
is what happens to things that are to some extent in legislative limbo. We 
could add to that, for example, the clinical trials regulation, which is not yet 
fully transposed.77
52. The Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) also highlighted that 
European State Aid legislation currently limits the Government’s ability to invest in the 
private sector, and that opportunities would arise after Brexit:
There would then be scope for the UK government to look to tailor R&D 
schemes to benefit target sectors of the UK economy more effectively. There 
might also be benefit to universities, other public sector organisations and 
companies in easing the current EU procurement rules.78
Visas
53. Several of the risk assessment submissions we received highlighted the scope for 
creating a new visa regime that prioritised researchers at all career levels. Dr Sarah Main 
also noted that improvements could be made to visa processes for short research visits as 
part of a wider review:
The visa systems that are in place for short research visits can be quite 
burdensome […] It will be important, when we get down the line, in terms 
76 Science and Technology Committee, First Report of Session 2016–17, EU regulation of the life sciences, HC 158, 
para 17
77 Q70
78 HEFCE (LEA 230) para C
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of process and operating a new migration system, that we recognise that 
science is a mobile endeavour and that accessing research facilities in the 
EU will require quite a lot of short visits. Looking at the visa system to allow 
it to cope with a much larger number of people wanting permission for 
short-term travel will be important.79
79 Q16
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4 The Government’s vision for science 
outside the European Union
54. An overarching concern arising from the many written submissions we received was 
the need for the Government to develop a ‘vision’ for science and research in the context 
of Brexit. Dr Sarah Main from the Campaign for Science and Engineering argued that the 
Government should clarify “if and whether they believe that a science-research-intensive 
innovative future is one that they wish to develop in the UK”.80 Jo Johnson subsequently 
offered us the beginning of such a vision; he told us that:
British science wants to go from strength to strength in this new world. We 
want to support it in doing so. That means making sure that it is getting 
the best possible funding settlements available within the fiscal constraints 
that the Government find themselves in […] It means making sure that we 
have a really strong pipeline of talent that will enable us to take advantage 
of the research the community is generating. It means making sure that we 
are still attractive to collaboration around the world; that we are open, that 
we welcome talent and that we continue to generate a spectacular return 
on the public investment in our science base. That is the vision for science.81
55. He added that the Government was seeking to reassure the science community that it 
was “committed to keeping Britain at the forefront of science around the world”.82 Similar 
sentiments were expressed by the Prime Minister shortly after the Referendum:
The UK is rightly acknowledged as a world-leader in science and research [… ] 
It is why I would like to use this opportunity to reiterate the Government’s 
Manifesto and Spending Review commitments to protecting science and 
research funding in real terms […] I would like to reassure you about the 
Government’s commitment to ensuring a positive outcome for UK science 
as we exit the European Union.83
56. However, some of our witnesses suggested that leaving the EU exposes a difference 
between the Government’s recent level of ambition for science compared with the 
programmes that the European Union had developed. Dr Main told us that:
the EU has set for itself ambitious targets in terms of R and D activity, both 
monetary and collaborative in terms of addressing grand challenges and 
so on. The UK Government’s ambition in recent years has not matched the 
level of the EU, so, moving forward, if the Government could set out a really 
ambitious programme for science […] the rest will follow.84
80 Q4
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83 Letter from the Prime Minister to Sir Paul Nurse, 18 July 2016
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The voice of science in Brexit negotiations
57. Many of our witnesses highlighted the importance of ensuring that UK science and 
research has a voice in the Government’s Brexit planning and negotiations, in order to 
ensure that the issues raised during our inquiry were not lost amongst wider considerations. 
Dr Sarah Main, from the Campaign for Science and Engineering, argued that:
If [science] is represented among all the many other interests that are 
important to the UK, then the community will trust that it can feed into 
that voice. A voice at the table and a clear process—a structure—by which 
the community can feed in what it wishes to say would be what I would ask 
for.85
Similarly, Professor Philip Nelson, Chair of Research Councils UK, explained that:
One of the challenges we face is that so many of the issues are tied in with 
the bigger politics of it all, and it is quite an intimidating thought that this 
could easily get lost. Our real concern is that we do not lose some of the 
important features of our current landscape.86 […] it is very important 
that our [science community’s] voice is heard and that it is substantially 
transmitted in that negotiation.87
58. Jo Johnson told us that a “high-level forum” on the impact of Brexit for science 
and research was being established, which will “make sure that we are really capturing 
all the views of the distinct parts of the community”.88 He explained that he wanted to 
ensure that the Department for Exiting the EU was “as well informed as possible about 
the interests of the community”, and told us that he and DExEU ministers were “really 
working tightly together to ensure that the community’s views and interests are fully 
represented in [DExEU’s] work”.89 Clearly it is incumbent on the science and research 
community to ensure that it continues to express its concerns and priorities clearly as 
Brexit negotiation plans progress.
59. In the meantime, Jo Johnson envisaged that the creation of UK Research and 
Innovation (UKRI) would play a part in providing this information. The Higher Education 
and Research Bill will establish this body, bringing together the seven existing Research 
Councils, Innovate UK, and research funding from the Higher Education Funding 
Council for England. In a speech at the Wellcome Trust in June, the Minister said:
I have no doubt that the formation of UKRI will provide indispensable 
support to our research and innovation leadership during this period of 
change in our relationship with the European Union. Now, more than ever, 
as these communities face new challenges, we need a strong and unified 
voice to represent your interests across government, across Europe and 
around the world.90
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Sir John Kingman, appointed in May as the interim Chair of UKRI,91 told us that:
I have been spending a significant part of my time engaging with colleagues 
in Whitehall, both on Brexit-related issues and on ensuring that, for want 
of a better phrase, the new Government buy into the importance of this 
agenda for our country and economy. […] I have been very encouraged by 
the receptiveness of No. 10, the Treasury and obviously Ministers in BEIS to 
that line of argument […] I fully accept the responsibility to do everything 
I can to make sure that any downsides of Brexit are limited and any upsides 
are maximised.92
60. It is crucial that science and research have a clear ‘voice’ within DExEU and in 
developing Brexit negotiation strategies, but we are not yet convinced that this is the 
case. We welcome the Government’s plans to establish a high level group to capture the 
views of the science and research community and look forward to receiving further 
details in the Government’s response to this report. But the science perspective must 
be part of the Government’s planning now. The Government states that UKRI can 
provide such a voice. It should formally involve the interim Chair of UKRI as a bridge 
between BEIS and DExEU. We recommend that he engage publicly with the community 
to describe the progress made with securing a good outcome for science and research.
A Chief Scientific Adviser for DExEU
61. The Government is supported by a network of Chief Scientific Advisers (CSAs), 
with one appointed in each Government department. We asked Robin Walker on what 
timescale the newly created Department for Exiting the European Union (DExEU) 
would appoint a CSA. He told us on 26 October that “a vacancy has been advertised”93 
and Jo Johnson referred to DExEU having “got its advert out”.94 That reassurance was 
subsequently withdrawn when the Ministers wrote to explain that a job advert had not 
been issued, and that DExEU was still considering how best to get the scientific expertise 
it needs, since the Government Office for Science offered “a resource for the whole of 
Government”.95 The Ministers stated that DExEU “will be using those resources to make 
sure that we are properly informed on these things”.96
62. We were very disappointed to learn that the Department for Exiting the European 
Union is not currently progressing with appointing a departmental Chief Scientific 
Adviser (CSA). Such an adviser could help ensure that the impact on science and research 
of various models for Brexit, and the opportunities these provide, is understood and 
prioritised within the Department. A stronger Brexit role for UKRI should not be a 
substitute for a clear science voice within DExEU itself. We recommend that DExEU 
make appointing a Chief Scientific Adviser a matter of priority.
91 “John Kingman to lead creation of new £6 billion research and innovation body”, Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills, 17 May 2016
92 Oral evidence taken on 12 October 2016, HC 671, Qq25–29
93 Q166
94 Q169
95 Letter from Robin Walker MP and Jo Johnson MP to Science and Technology Committee Chair, 28 October 2016
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63. There is a need for the Government to articulate an ambitious vision for science 
that goes beyond continuing to be ‘open for business’ and generally seeking “a positive 
outcome” from leaving the EU. At this stage it may not be possible to articulate the 
detail of how any vision for science after-Brexit will be achieved, but a more ambitious 
statement would provide greater reassurance in the current climate of uncertainty. 
The beginnings of this were provided by the Science Minister in his evidence to us, but 
such a vision needs to be developed and propagated much further.
64. The Government must send a clear message now that it intends to protect the UK’s 
strength in science. To help allay the uncertainty arising from the Referendum result, it 
should set out its objectives for addressing the priority areas of concern for the science 
community—funding, people, collaboration, regulation and facilities. It should use the 
opportunity of the Autumn Statement later this month to commit, as we have previously 
recommended, to raising the UK’s expenditure on science R&D to 3% of GDP. This would 
demonstrate a determination not only to negotiating a post-Brexit relationship with the 
EU that is good for science but also to secure opportunities for science collaboration with 
markets beyond Europe.
Monitoring the impact
65. Such a post-Brexit vision will have to be regularly restated, but also updated so that it 
continues to take account of views about emerging risks and opportunities. This requires 
monitoring the priority areas we have discussed in this report to detect changes as a result 
of beginning the process of leaving the EU. The Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute told us 
that monitoring the impact of Brexit in terms of the effect on people required a detailed 
disaggregation of data:
Particular areas to focus attention on are positions which by their nature are 
relatively short (3 years or less) but highly skilled and highly mobile groups, 
such as postdoctoral fellowships, visiting workers and PhD students […] 
Recruitment figures and overall funding figures should be relatively easy 
to gather from multiple UK sources, however understanding the impact 
of reduced access to certain funding streams (if that is what eventually 
happens) will be far more challenging to understand than simple financial 
impact. Metrics for the movement of researchers, the roles researchers are 
playing on collaborative grants (lead or supporting) and the numbers of 
visiting workers, postdoctoral fellows etc. could help the Government to 
monitor the change in working practices. This is of course dependent on 
having such metrics prior to the referendum vote.97
66. The European Commission told us that it routinely monitors Horizon 2020 
participation rates, and that the 2016 annual monitoring report would be available in the 
first semester of 2017.98 Comparing participation rates in 2016 with previous figures could 
provide some insight into whether UK partners are being left out of bids, but these figures 
will be subject to some natural variability.
97 Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute (LEA 133) paras 28–29
98 European Commission (LEA 287)
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67. The Government must set out the metrics it will use to assess how well the UK avoids 
the risks of Brexit for science and research and secures the benefits. It should monitor 
these metrics during the course of the Brexit negotiations, and regularly publish the 
results. We intend to ask the Minister for science for updates periodically during the 
course of the Brexit process.
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Conclusions and recommendations
Short-term responses to uncertainty
1. The Government has provided helpful reassurance to the science and research 
community by promising to underwrite the payment of EU grants extending 
beyond the point at which the UK leaves the European Union. However welcome 
this announcement is, it does not appear to represent a significant new financial 
investment, given that the EU itself apparently has a legal commitment to honour 
these payments. (Paragraph 20)
2. There is more to be done to spread the messages of recent Government announcements 
before the communications strategy can be described as ‘comprehensive’. In this 
context, the communication of the policy is as important as the policy itself. 
(Paragraph 24)
3. In the light of continuing uncertainty about the risks and opportunities for science 
following exit from the EU it is vital that the Government has a comprehensive 
communications strategy for this critical area. At the heart of such a strategy should 
be a clear understanding of the different audiences with which the Government 
should communicate, their existing levels of understanding, and the different forms 
of communication that will be most effective for each group. (Paragraph 25)
4. We recommend that the Government present to us a genuinely comprehensive strategy 
for communicating its messages of ongoing support for science and research in the 
context of its plans for leaving the EU and the negotiations to follow. The strategy 
should be much more than a collection of high-level meetings and speeches within 
the UK, and should include an analysis of key audiences in other countries, such as 
researchers who could be encouraged to work here. (Paragraph 26)
Securing the best outcome for science and research from the Brexit 
process
5. The Government will need to address all of the priority issues for the science 
community listed in this report—funding, people, collaboration, regulation 
and facilities—as a coherent whole rather than a list of separate considerations. 
(Paragraph 29)
6. We understand that the Government is not yet able to offer firmer guarantees regarding 
future immigration rules for researchers but remind them that this is essential in order 
to continue to attract top-quality researchers to the UK. We recognise that planning 
for exit negotiations is still underway, but there is clear agreement that researcher 
mobility is a crucial component of the UK’s successful research and science sector. The 
issue should be treated separately from discussions about immigration control more 
broadly, with firm commitments provided as soon as possible. (Paragraph 37)
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7. The Government should deliver on the Prime Minister’s early reassurance to EU 
researchers currently working in the UK, that certainty for them will be a Government 
priority, by making an immediate commitment to exempt them from Brexit negotiations 
on any reciprocal immigration controls for workers already in post. (Paragraph 40)
The Government’s vision for science outside the European Union
8. It is crucial that science and research have a clear ‘voice’ within DExEU and in 
developing Brexit negotiation strategies, but we are not yet convinced that this is 
the case. We welcome the Government’s plans to establish a high level group to 
capture the views of the science and research community and look forward to 
receiving further details in the Government’s response to this report. But the science 
perspective must be part of the Government’s planning now. The Government states 
that UKRI can provide such a voice. It should formally involve the interim Chair of 
UKRI as a bridge between BEIS and DExEU. We recommend that he engage publicly 
with the community to describe the progress made with securing a good outcome for 
science and research. (Paragraph 60)
9. We were very disappointed to learn that the Department for Exiting the European 
Union is not currently progressing with appointing a departmental Chief Scientific 
Adviser (CSA). Such an adviser could help ensure that the impact on science 
and research of various models for Brexit, and the opportunities these provide, 
is understood and prioritised within the Department. A stronger Brexit role for 
UKRI should not be a substitute for a clear science voice within DExEU itself. We 
recommend that DExEU make appointing a Chief Scientific Adviser a matter of 
priority. (Paragraph 62)
10. There is a need for the Government to articulate an ambitious vision for science that 
goes beyond continuing to be ‘open for business’ and generally seeking “a positive 
outcome” from leaving the EU. At this stage it may not be possible to articulate 
the detail of how any vision for science after-Brexit will be achieved, but a more 
ambitious statement would provide greater reassurance in the current climate 
of uncertainty. The beginnings of this were provided by the Science Minister in 
his evidence to us, but such a vision needs to be developed and propagated much 
further. (Paragraph 63)
11. The Government must send a clear message now that it intends to protect the UK’s 
strength in science. To help allay the uncertainty arising from the Referendum result, it 
should set out its objectives for addressing the priority areas of concern for the science 
community—funding, people, collaboration, regulation and facilities. It should use 
the opportunity of the Autumn Statement later this month to commit, as we have 
previously recommended, to raising the UK’s expenditure on science R&D to 3% of 
GDP. This would demonstrate a determination not only to negotiating a post-Brexit 
relationship with the EU that is good for science but also to secure opportunities for 
science collaboration with markets beyond Europe. (Paragraph 64)
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12. The Government must set out the metrics it will use to assess how well the UK avoids 
the risks of Brexit for science and research and secures the benefits. It should monitor 
these metrics during the course of the Brexit negotiations, and regularly publish the 
results. We intend to ask the Minister for science for updates periodically during the 
course of the Brexit process. (Paragraph 67)
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Annex: Issues raised in written and oral evidence
We received over 270 written submissions to our inquiry, providing a wealth of information on the many issues of interest to the science and research community 
in the context of leaving the European Union. An illustrative selection of these issues are reproduced here, although it is not intended to be a comprehensive 
summary of the many issues raised. As the Government turns its attention to addressing the overarching issues highlighted in this report it should draw on these 
and other submissions to understand the community’s concerns.
Table 1: Funding
Issue Description and written evidence references Notes
Concerns 
that the UK 
might not be 
able to access 
EU funding, 
including 
Framework 
Programmes 
(Horizon 
2020) and 
structural 
funds, after 
the UK leaves 
the EU—
depending on 
which future 
UK-EU model 
is chosen.
The University of Southampton quoted data from the Swiss Secretariat for Education, Research 
and Innovation (SERI), showing the effect of Switzerland’s move to a partial association model, 
and described this as a “substantial decline in Swiss involvement and income during this period of 
uncertainty”.1 The SERI report goes on to state that “If Switzerland were to be fully downgraded 
to third-country status from 2017 onwards, its opportunities for participation and influence 
would be extremely limited. We would also expect to see an even sharper decrease in the 
financial and quantitative shares of Swiss participation in the [Framework Programmes]. A further 
concern would be the potential isolation of Swiss-based researchers. The fear is that over the 
long term, third country status could lead to a loss of expertise and could reduce Switzerland’s 
influence in research circles, both in Europe and indeed globally”.
HEFCE described the benefits of funds beyond Horizon 2020, particularly in supporting 
innovation: “EU public and private funds have played a significant role in supporting innovation 
in the UK. UK universities have received around £100M p/a from ERDF and ESF funding streams 
over the last three years to support a range of economic regeneration activities. Structural Funds 
have helped to improve regional competitiveness and absorptive capacity. Competitiveness and 
capacity are also supported by domestic businesses’ ability to access a range of EU funds including 
H2020. The European investment fund has provided important SME financing which in turn has 
leveraged venture capital and private equity funds. Each finance stream invests in private sector 
capacity to engage in research and development and this then helps university enterprise activity 
and innovation partnerships to be successful. In addition, universities have benefitted from 
working with EU businesses with good levels of research and development capacity and a high 
tech focus”.2
A description of the existing models 
for non EU-member involvement in 
Horizon 2020 is provided in the House 
of Lords Science and Technology 
report. This includes a description of 
the “Swiss model”. 
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Issue Description and written evidence references Notes
Ability to 
lead projects 
and influence 
the EU 
Framework 
Programmes 
post-Brexit
The University of Oxford told us that: “For the UK (and in particular UK universities), whilst 
participation in projects is, of course, desirable, future success and the UK’s competitive edge is 
also dependent on the ability to influence the content of future research programmes, the areas 
for large-scale investment in research as well as the content of EU directives that affect research 
in the UK (eg animal testing, open access & data mining). It is vital that the UK is driving the 
research agenda rather than following the agenda of other member states.3
The House of Lords Science and 
Technology Committee noted that: 
“The UK currently has significant 
influence on the development 
of EU policy for science. It is not 
entirely clear how this would be 
affected in the event of termination 
of membership and adoption of 
Associated Country status”.4
The need for 
appropriate 
levels of 
funding to 
be delivered 
through 
appropriate 
new schemes, 
if access to 
Horizon 2020 
and other 
funding 
streams 
cannot be 
negotiated 
The Royal Academy of Engineering wrote that: “If the UK was unable to secure continued access 
to EU research and innovation programmes, it would be essential for the UK government to 
create suitable replacement research and innovation programmes using national funds. Any such 
replacement programmes should replicate the successful and unique aspects of EU programmes, 
including support targeted at collaboration and partnership at many different levels, including 
researchers, universities, large corporates and SMEs, plus long term visibility of themes and 
subject areas”.5
Loughborough University wrote that: “Participation in EU research projects is about much more 
than access to another research funding stream. Advances in research and consequent benefits to 
society and economy could not be realised by simply placing the same level of funding through a 
UK funding body”.6
The Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute described these features in more detail: “European funding 
structures have a number of significant differences from UK sources, but in conversations with 
Institute faculty the themes of investigator-led funding calls, mobility and career development 
came up repeatedly. Many faculty felt that the strategic direction of EU funding was more driven 
by investigators themselves than in the UK and this often led to the EU funding more ambitious 
projects than UK research councils were willing to. The EU also supports individuals through 
their career stages more than is currently the case in the UK. EU funding for career development 
fellowships is more generous and does not require a sponsor to top up the award, unlike most UK 
funders”.7
The University of Edinburgh added that “even if all displaced H2020 funding is fully replaced and 
ring fenced, it is possible that UK researchers will be still be disadvantaged if industry partners 
perceive that their contributions are better leveraged through Horizon 2020, with a consequent 
net drain of industrial sponsorship from UK universities in favour of their European rivals.”8
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Issue Description and written evidence references Notes
The Institute of Chartered Foresters queried which bodies would be distributing any replacement 
funding and to whom: “Whilst it would be good to ensure the UK continues to spend on research 
what it repatriates, it must ensure that whatever it does spend is available, on a level playing 
field, for all research bodies that can currently apply for EU funding namely, Universities, Public 
Sector Research Organisations, SMEs etc. Any funds repatriated should not be given solely to 
Research Councils to administer as they are not all-inclusive”.9
The University of Cambridge highlighted a need to ensure any domestic funding routes are 
synchronised with those in other countries: “The Government’s Balance of Competences Review 
(2014) found that international collaborations with non-EU members are made more difficult 
by the reliance of researchers in different countries on different funding cycles. Potential UK 
participants could run into problems in ‘synchronising’ research projects and funding with EU 
partners, in the event of the UK no longer being a full participant in Horizon 2020”.10
Key features 
of EU funding 
that should 
be preserved 
or imitated
The University of the Arts London (UAL) described EU funding as an “an approach that in many 
ways is more attractive than Research Council schemes to an institution like UAL”. UAL pointed to:
–Greater notice of funding calls, which gives HEIs time to assemble consortia. (A complaint about 
major Research Council directed calls is that the public notice period is so short that only those 
with informal prior knowledge have a serious chance of assembling a fully resolved response.)
–Wider and more inclusive support for academic and industrial partnerships. The structure of EU 
funding means that commercialisation is more integrated into the project lifecycle. This approach 
is especially attractive to the design discipline with its close links to professional practice.
–Greater opportunities for UK companies to be involved in publicly funded research. UK 
companies are keen to be involved in EU funding but SMEs in particular are wary of their 
complexity. UK universities provide a vehicle for British companies to engage with funding 
streams and expertise to which they would never normally have access.
–More opportunities to learn about funder priorities and expectations. Feedback on applications 
is more extensive and detailed than that from the Research Councils. Applicants can learn how to 
improve the quality of their bids, and so increase their chances of being funded in later calls.
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Issue Description and written evidence references Notes
Criticisms of 
EU funding 
routes that 
should not be 
replicated
The Chartered Institute of Foresters hoped that any future system would be as simple and free 
from “red tape” as possible, noting that “the Horizon 2020 programme has made substantial 
advances in reducing complexity and bureaucracy but many other EU funding mechanisms (LIFE+, 
Interreg and others) remain labyrinthine and non-uniform in their approach to eligible costs”.11
A group of researchers at Swansea University observed that “Rules and regulations around EU 
funding applications and grants are designed to fit a wide variety of funding calls over multiple 
programmes and research areas. As such, the known issue of overextended time-to-grant and 
intrinsic complexity of European funding create a high threshold of administrative knowledge 
and resources necessary to navigate these funds”. They suggested that “By returning the key 
sources of funding to the nation state level, Brexit may offer an opportunity to streamline 
research guidelines, thus reducing the resource burden of both applying for and undertaking 
large research grants. Some researchers indicate that many UK funding bodies, including RCUK 
bodies, Innovate UK and the Wellcome Trust, are all already simpler and more user-friendly than 
EU funding”.12
Ian Byrne, the Deputy CEO of a small charity undertaking research and development in the area 
of sustainable energy, told us that “In recent years, the EU has consolidated many of its funding 
strands into just two: those around the European Social Funds and, for science-based activities, 
Horizon 2020. This has had the effect of reducing the number of projects being funded, while 
maintaining the total level of expenditure. While this may be beneficial for fundamental research 
in “big science” it has not helped smaller organisations such as ours, working in fields where 
much of the research is incremental. In particular, in the area of energy efficiency we have seen a 
trend towards funding a few disconnected projects each year, which often appear to suffer from 
bloated administration yet modest achievements”.13
The effect of 
reliance on 
EU funding 
on smaller 
HEIs
We were told that “Smaller organisations such as Goldsmiths have relied heavily on access to the 
ERC and EU income to ensure their research income remains stable. Reduced access to EU funding 
sources would negatively affect this stability”.14
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Issue Description and written evidence references Notes
The effect of 
reliance on 
EU funding 
on smaller 
subjects
Representatives of some smaller research subjects in the UK were concerned about the level of 
their current reliance on EU funding. For instance, the Institute of Acoustics told us that 47% of 
funding for acoustics-related research in the UK is received through EU routes,15 and the Institute 
of Conservation highlighted Heritage Science as an area with a similar level of dependence on EU 
funding.16
Some information on the current 
level of reliance on EU funding by 
discipline was provided by RCUK.17 
Over the three-year period from 
2012/13 to 2014/15, EU Government 
Bodies provided 13% of all research 
grants and contracts income to UK 
universities. The variability is not 
restricted to ‘small’ subjects; Chemistry 
and “IT, system sciences, and computer 
software engineering” both appear 
in RCUK’s top ten subject centres by 
proportion of income from EU bodies 
(at 21.5% and 30.9% respectively), and 
also in the top ten by total level of EU 
income (at £155m and £142m)
Need to map 
EU funding 
mechanisms
Scientists for EU told us that “There is probably not, at this stage, enough appreciation of the 
myriad EU-based mechanisms that bring funds into innovative players in both the public and 
private sector at the moment. These must be mapped urgently. Horizon 2020 and the ”EU 
Structural Funds” (Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund–jointly €10.8billion 
allocated to the UK from 2014–2020) are not the only investments”.
They highlighted the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI) as one such route:”[EFSI], 
also known as the “Juncker Plan” is a recent initiative (launched jointly by the European 
Investment Bank, European Investment Fund and European Commission) aimed at using public 
funds strategically to dramatically leverage private investment into innovation. “The EFSI aims to 
overcome current market failures by addressing market gaps and mobilising private investment. 
It will support strategic investments in key areas such as infrastructure, education, research and 
innovation, as well as risk finance for small businesses.”18
1 University of Southampton (LEA 97) para 25
2 HEFCE (LEA 230) para A
3 University of Oxford (LEA 184) para 1
4 House of Lords, EU membership and UK science, Second report of the Science and Technology Committee, Session 2015–16, HL Paper 127, para 228
5 Royal Academy of Engineering (LEA 279) para 2.5
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6 Loughborough University (LEA 109)
7 Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute (LEA 133) para 26
8 University of Edinburgh (LEA 159) para 13
9 Institute of Chartered Foresters (LEA 156) para 6
10 University of Cambridge (LEA 42)
11 Chartered Institute of Foresters (LEA 156) para 2
12 IMPACKT, Swansea University (LEA 138) para 7
13 Ian Byrne (LEA 134)
14 Goldsmiths, University of London (LEA 252) para 17
15 Institute of Acoustics (LEA 73) para 3
16 Institute of Conservation (LEA 86) para 1.1.1
17 Research Councils UK (LEA 235) annex 1
18 Scientists for EU (LEA 261) 2.3 
Table 2: People
Issue Description and written evidence references Notes
Costs from visa 
requirements 
Dr Julian Downward warned that the Crick Institute’s annual 
expenditure on processing visa and work permit applications could 
rise “from about £70,000 to some £250,000, if rules introduced to 
regulate entry of EU nationals are similar to those currently applied 
to non-EU nationals”.19 Similarly, the University of Oxford estimated 
that there could be “anything up to a tripling of work load” in 
order to process additional visa applications.20
The Society for the Environment noted the possibility of a 
“research passport” model as a solution, based on the National 
Health Service (NHS) research passport, “which grants honorary 
research contracts or letters of access to those who need to 
undertake research within the NHS”.21 However, the Society noted 
that “whilst a similar system would be a good compromise for 
those who conduct research, it may not be a suitable model for 
industries employing scientists who work in the field but do not 
conduct research as part of their activities”.
Movement of 
researchers 
potentially 
constrained by 
caps on overall 
immigration 
levels
The University of Cambridge explained that the current limits on 
Tier 2 visas meant that this route “would be unlikely to have the 
capacity to absorb the numbers of EU nationals which the sector 
would require”.22
The UK currently controls immigration from countries outside 
the EU through a system of visa ‘tiers’, which includes a mix of 
‘points-based’ and ‘employer-led selection’ components. This 
includes tier-1 visas (‘exceptional talent’ /entrepreneurs), tier-2 visas 
(‘skilled workers’), tier-4 visas (students) and tier-5 visas (which 
includes approved ‘research placement’ schemes). Tier-1 and tier-2 
visas have quotas—the 1,000 a year cap on tier-1 visas include an 
allocation of 250 places to be endorsed by the Royal Society, 150 by 
the Royal Academy of Engineering and 150 by the British Academy.
In March 2016, before the EU Referendum, the Government 
announced reforms to the skilled worker visa (Tier-2), following 
a review of the route by the Migration Advisory Committee, 
including an increase in the minimum salary threshold for 
experienced workers using Tier 2, from £20,800 to £25,000 in 
Autumn 2016 and £30,000 in April 2017 (For new entrants to 
the workforce, including those under 25, the minimum will be 
£23,000), and the introduction of an ‘immigration skills charge’ for 
each non-EEA worker an employer wants to bring to the UK (larger 
sponsors of Tier 2 migrants would be charged £1,000 per migrant 
a year, £364 for small businesses and charities). There would be an 
exemption for migrants undertaking PhD level roles
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Issue Description and written evidence references Notes
Reassurance for 
EU researchers 
currently in the 
UK is needed 
to avoid ‘brain 
drain’
The University of Leicester suggested that “There should be a 
fast-track way of enabling non-UK EU academics and researchers 
(including after any envisaged transition date) to obtain the right 
to remain in the UK when employed by the universities”.
The Babraham Institute wrote that “Action is needed immediately, 
EU-nationals need to be reassured that their status is protected 
now and in the future, or we risk losing the ‘best brains’ before 
negotiations even begin”.23
Student access 
to loans
UUK called on the Government to “Provide immediate reassurances 
to EU students starting in academic year 2016/17 regarding their 
unchanged tuition fee status and for 2017/18 entrants on their 
ability to access student loans, recognising that the UCAS cycle 
opens on 6 September 2016”.24 The Russell Group went further: 
“Our experience suggests that future cohorts of students will also 
be making decisions about where to study even though they may 
not be expecting to start until 2018/19 or 2019/20. This is expected 
to be a crucial time when negotiations between the UK and the EU 
may conclude and early clarification from the Government on the 
expected status of these students would be very welcome”.25
The Government announced on 11 October that “EU students 
applying for a place at an English university or further education 
institution in the 2017 to 2018 academic year will continue to be 
eligible for student loans and grants—and will be for the duration 
of their course”.26
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Issue Description and written evidence references Notes
Financial 
consequences 
of changes in 
EU student fees
The University of Oxford explained that “At the moment, students 
from the EU pay the same fees as ‘home’ students. It has been 
suggested that a positive outcome of a UK withdrawal from the EU 
will be the charging of international student fees to EU students, 
thus giving UK Universities a huge boost in fee income. In theory, 
this sounds like an excellent proposition. However, those who deal 
with student recruitment believe that, in reality, there will be a 
huge drop in numbers from the EU as students chose to study at 
one of the many excellent universities in mainland Europe. The 
result would actually be a huge drop in fee income (as well as the 
loss of some excellent students). There is strong feeling that if EU 
fees are raised to the level of overseas students there will be a 
knock-on effect on the make-up of the students we see applying, 
as UK courses become exponentially more unaffordable (especially 
compared to other EU providers)”.27
The University of Liverpool provided some figures on the possible 
financial consequences: “Projections based on no new EU students 
coming to Liverpool show the loss in fee income in 2016/17 would 
be around £2.5M, rising to £6.2M in 2018/19. If only 50% of 
students currently forecast came there would be a potential loss of 
over £3M”.28
Universities UK called for the Government to produce “an 
international student strategy, backed by investment to support 
international marketing, mobility and partnerships in both Europe 
and across the world including a quantitative target to increase 
international student recruitment”.29
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Issue Description and written evidence references Notes
Access to 
ERASMUS 
exchange 
programmes
Loughborough University wrote that “Studying abroad and 
ERASMUS exchanges are life-shaping events for young people, 
preparing them for careers working across nations and cultures. 
Their careers will deliver economic prosperity to the UK. Exclusion 
from programmes would be hugely to our detriment and will 
not be replaced on anything like the same scale by piecemeal 
opportunities around the world”.30
Loughborough University went on to provide figures: “Student 
mobility is clearly a very significant EU achievement. At 
Loughborough some 600 students are EU (non-UK) nationals. Their 
fee income amounts to £5M and they spend similar sums in the 
local economy. They enrich our community immeasurably, as do 
our exchange students. 170 students/year come to Loughborough 
on ERASMUS exchange and we send the same number out, 2/3 to 
study and 1/3 to work. As an indication of the success of ERASMUS, 
we can compare with exchanges with the rest of the world which 
serve as an indicator of likely levels of activity in a UK outside the 
EU. Despite the attractions of major English-speaking nations, the 
absence of formal programmes results in a much smaller activity, 
about 20 students in and 20 out. Exchanges are life-shaping events 
for these young people, preparing them for careers working across 
nations and cultures that will deliver economic prosperity to the 
UK. Exclusion from programmes would be hugely to our detriment 
and would not be replaced on anything like the same scale by 
piecemeal opportunities around the world”.31
The Education Committee is holding its own inquiry into the 
implications of Brexit for Higher Education, which will include the 
UK’s participation in the ERASMUS scheme.33
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Issue Description and written evidence references Notes
The Russell Group said that “The Erasmus programme has also 
benefited UK and EU students and universities for many years. 
Over 15,000 students from UK universities took part in the 
Erasmus+ programme in 2013/14, nearly half of whom were from 
Russell Group universities. The programme provides an experience 
that is valuable to those individuals and to employers who want 
graduates with experience of other cultures and language skills. 
The Government has confirmed the referendum result does not 
affect beneficiaries of Erasmus+ or those considering applying in 
2017 but there is currently no clarity beyond that. We hope the 
Government will negotiate for the UK to have continued access to 
the Erasmus+ programme beyond 2017”.32
Visas for short 
visits
The MRC Laboratory of Molecular Biology in Cambridge told us 
that “short-term working visits and internships are the lifeblood of 
scientific collaboration and information transfer”, but that current 
immigration rules make it “extremely difficult” to host such visits 
from non-EU citizens. The laboratory was concerned that similar 
restrictions could apply to visits from EU citizens after Brexit, 
noting that such visits “do not lead to immigration nor compete for 
jobs, so their restriction serves little obvious purpose”.34
19 Dr Julian Downward (LEA 187)
20 University of Oxford (LEA 184)
21 The Society for the Environment (LEA 192) para 2.2
22 University of Cambridge (LEA 42)
23 Babraham Institute (LEA 124) para 2.2
24 Universities UK (LEA 275)
25 Russell Group (LEA 180) para 3.3
26 “Funding support for EU students”, Department for Education press release, 11 October 2016
27 University of Oxford (LEA 184)
28 University of Liverpool (LEA 222) para 6
29 Universities UK (LEA 275) para 18
30 Loughborough University (LEA 109) p1
31 Loughborough University (LEA 109) para 2.4
32 Russell Group (LEA 180) para 3.6
33 “The impact of exiting the European Union on higher education”, Education Committee, accessed 4 November 2016
34 MRC Laboratory of Molecular Biology, Cambridge (LEA 74) para 4
41
 Leavin
g
 th
e EU
: im
p
licatio
n
s an
d
 o
p
p
o
rtu
n
ities fo
r scien
ce an
d
 research
 
Table 3: Collaboration
Issue Description and written evidence reference Notes
Collaboration requires 
dedicated funding
The Royal Society observed that collaboration was dependent on funding, and that: “Leaving 
the EU will not create spare capacity for collaboration elsewhere unless supporting funds are 
identified, ring-fenced and made available. If the UK wishes to increase global collaboration then 
it must increase the funding and support to make it possible, ideally encouraging collaborations 
both in Europe and further afield.35
Some research is only 
possible through 
collaboration
International collaboration is important for conducting studies that require large populations, 
such as clinical trials of medicines for rare diseases.36 The Royal Society of Biology told us that: 
“Research on cancer, mental health, imaging, neurodegenerative disease, tissue engineering, 
bioinformatics, and conservation among others will be heavily and negatively affected if 
the UK is unable to maintain involvement in centralized EU-wide initiatives. By their nature 
these research efforts require, for example, large patient pools, or distributed ecosystems, or 
infrastructure that is beyond the scope of any individual country. Many specialisms, for example 
endocrinology, cover rare diseases requiring a large population from which to draw viable study 
cohorts. Similarly, capacity to conduct studies on trans-national boundary infectious diseases 
(clinical and veterinary) is essential for research as well as disease control and public health. 
International collaboration and outlook is key.37
Loughborough University emphasised the need for recognition that “participation in EU research 
projects is about much more than access to another research funding stream”.38 The university 
provided case studies of projects that could not be delivered by UK partners alone, even with 
equivalent levels of funding, and explained that: “The collaborations across EU states enable 
projects to happen where teams with the required skills cannot be assembled within single 
nations, as well as where climatic, cultural and behavioural differences are fundamental to the 
motivation for, delivery of and ultimately the success of the project.39
Similarly, the Marine Biological Association explained that “Sophisticated Research Vessels, such 
as the new RRS Sir David Attenborough, can still only operate in one location at any given time 
so that no one nation can afford to conduct research across the global oceans on their own. 
With the threats to the seas, through climate warming, acidification and pollution, international 
collaboration in marine science is essential”.40
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Issue Description and written evidence reference Notes
There are many EU 
structures for promoting 
collaboration
RCUK explained that: “JPIs, ERA-Nets and CSAs foster and support international collaboration at 
a strategic and research level, reducing fragmentation and adding value to national investment:
–Joint Programming Initiatives (JPIs) pool and align national research efforts to more effectively 
tackle common European challenges, many of which have a wider global impact. There are ten 
JPIs in key areas such as neurodegenerative disease, cultural heritage, antimicrobial resistance 
and climate change.
–European Research Area Networks (ERA-NETs) strengthen co-ordination of national and 
regional research programmes by providing a framework to develop joint activities and support 
joint calls for transnational proposals. The Research Councils support UK involvement in around 
twenty such platforms, aligning with areas of key national interest such as diet and health, 
synthetic biology and urban futures and often receiving additional EU funding for particular 
activities.
–Coordination and Support Actions (CSAs) support coordination and networking–including 
workshops, development of collaborative activities and knowledge exchange -particularly where 
relationships are new and emerging”.41
A new research funding 
stream for collaboration is 
needed
Researchers at Swansea University suggested that “The UK should provide some funding, with 
a low administrative hurdle, to researchers with proven and pre-existing European networks 
who are already or about to start developing collaborative bids. This would dissuade other 
EU partners from dropping UK universities from projects and provide a strong signal that UK 
research will continue to be outward looking”.42
35 Royal Society of Biology (LEA 225) para 3
36 Academy of Medical Sciences (LEA 265)
37 Royal Society of Biology (LEA 225) para 2
38 Loughborough University (LEA 109) para 2.8
39 Loughborough University (LEA 109) para 2.8 ff
40 Marine Biological Association (LEA 278) para 5
41 Research Councils UK (LEA 235)
42 IMPACKT, Swansea University (LEA 138) para 12
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Table 4: Regulation
Issue Description and written evidence references Notes
Regulations relevant to science 
and research requiring review, 
and the process for this
The Babraham Institute told us that: “A substantial amount of work will be needed to 
review science and technology-related legislation, regulations and projects. Areas to 
be covered will include: health & safety, employment laws, IP, commercialisation and 
technology transfer practices, and animal research regulations.43
Universities UK provided a substantial list of regulations relevant to science and 
research that will need to be reviewed,44 and the Institute of Physics and Engineering 
in Medicine highlighted others specific to medical physics and clinical engineering.45 
The Institution for Environmental Sciences listed several regulations relevant to 
environmental research.46
Jo Johnson told us that:
“We need to look at what 
kind of relationship we are 
going to have to the rest of 
the European Union before 
we can give a clear picture 
about the regulatory systems 
we will continue and those 
that we might be able to 
change and adapt. They 
will all form part of a very 
detailed piece of work, which 
will be undertaken within 
the Department and across 
Government over the weeks 
and months to come”.
4
4
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Issue Description and written evidence references Notes
Specific regulations: Clinical 
trials
Many organisations highlighted the Clinical trials directive as relevant to science and 
research. The British Pharmaceutical Society explained that “New EU Clinical Trials 
Regulations are set to come into force by the end of 2018. These regulations are meant 
to harmonise procedures for assessing clinical trials applications, as well as enhancing 
collaboration between ethics committees, streamlining safety-reporting procedures 
and increasing transparency surrounding the outcome of clinical trials. These 
regulations will create a centralised gateway for clinical trial applications. However, 
Brexit means that UK patients will be left out of this new system, leaving EU patients 
ahead in accessing the latest innovative clinical research. The likely impact on the UK 
of not being involved in these new regulations is thought to be major and needs to be 
carefully assessed”.47
UCL wrote that “If the UK leaves the EU, there will be significant implications for 
medical research involving clinical trials or use of human samples which have obtained 
ethical and patient consents. This will affect both ongoing research projects, where 
consent was given under a previous regulatory regime, and future research projects, 
which will have to comply with multiple sets of regulation. This poses a currently 
overlooked but highly significant risk to the undertaking of medical research and 
could affect the UK’s pre-eminence in this field. Pharmaceutical research will also be 
affected both in terms of prospects for investment (the UK alone is less attractive than 
the UK as gateway to the EU market) and because of the consequences of regulatory 
divergence for drug development (the UK becomes a less attractive place to develop 
drugs for the EU market) […] It is likely that ongoing clinical projects will either have to 
re-seek consent or abandon some or all of their previous work. UK researchers will find 
it increasingly difficult to collaborate with EU partners in future if their involvement 
necessitates compliance with two different regulatory regimes.48
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Issue Description and written evidence references Notes
Specific regulations: Data 
protection
The Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute told us that “The UK was recently instrumental in 
the negotiation of the new Data Protection Regulation, with UK science being strongly 
represented. The question has now arisen of whether the UK will adopt this legislation 
and the government can and should make a decision on this as soon as possible. The 
ability of UK science to generate, collect, process and share data is vital especially given 
the national drive towards “big data science” and establishing legislation compatible 
with EU legislation is vital”.49
Open Data Institute also raised data regulation issues: “The EU is implementing the 
General Data Protection Regulation, which requires personal data be managed in 
countries with similar standards of privacy rules. The EU is also developing the Free 
Flow of Data initiative to regulate flows of data within the EU. The UK may leave 
the EU without an agreement for data flows and personal data management. [A 
consequence could be that] UK researchers may lose access to data about EU citizens, 
due to incompatible data regulations. Certain types of research may be hampered 
(longitudinal studies into health, for example)”.50
Specific regulations: Toxicology The British Toxicology Society wrote that “An example of an EU regulation that has 
wide-ranging implications for the UK following withdrawal from the EU is REACH 
(Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals). UK exporters to 
the EU of products ranging from bulk chemicals and cars to cleaning products, will still 
need to abide by REACH. Under REACH, an Only Representative (OR) is a legal entity 
responsible for the chemicals to be registered or pre-registered. All non-EU importers 
must appoint an OR. Currently an OR needs to be in the European Economic Area 
(EEA) in order to make a REACH registration. Without a negotiated change to the 
current regulation, following the UK withdrawal from the EU many small companies 
will no longer be able to be responsible for their own REACH registrations for exports 
to the EU and consultants who provide this function as a service will no longer be 
able to do so directly from a UK based company. In the absence of a negotiated 
arrangement, companies wishing to provide an OR service would need to collaborate 
with a business within the EEA—an additional overhead”.51
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Issue Description and written evidence references Notes
Specific regulations: GM In our report on EU regulation of the life sciences we concluded that “too often, the 
precautionary principle has been wilfully misused in the formulation of EU life science 
policy-making, including and notably for Genetically Modified Organisms”.52 In our 
current inquiry, the NFU told us that: “Leaving the EU could provide Britain with the 
opportunity to develop and harness certain technologies, such as biotechnology, that 
have been hindered by over politicised and unscientific decision-making. […] Being 
outside of the EU could enable the UK to authorise new crops and traits more quickly, 
for use in feed, food and for cultivation.53
The Royal Society of Biology wrote that “An important consideration following 
the UK exit from the EU would be the regulations concerning the use of GMOs in 
agriculture and the status of genome editing. The current EU approval process is 
viewed by many scientists as burdensome and dissuading innovation. The UK might 
have an opportunity to develop its own regulations in this area. However, this would 
not necessarily lead to adoption or commercial growing of approved GMOs in the UK, 
because public, political and economic considerations must combine in this decision-
making”.54
Similarly, the Agricultural Biotechnology Council (ABC) wrote that “Given the strength 
of the UK science base, there is now an opportunity to boost this base through the 
implementation of better regulation. ABC is primarily focused with agricultural 
biotechnology, and as such is particularly concerned with the regulation of GM crops. 
As such, ABC believes that the future regulation of GM crops in the UK should be led 
by scientific evidence and safety assessments should be ‘risk-based’. There is also the 
prospect of the UK becoming a leader in new technologies, such as Novel Breeding 
Techniques (NBTs), which can help to overcome some limitations of traditional 
breeding and enlarge the portfolio of products developed in the UK. Although 
relatively new, NBTs hold the potential to speed up the conventional breeding process 
and have the potential to increase the competitiveness of agriculture in the UK. The EU 
is yet to agree regulations for these technologies, however if the UK were to adopt a 
science-led approach to regulation, there is an opportunity for the UK to be a leading 
light in seed research and development (R&D), and for UK farmers to reap the benefits 
of early access to new tools before their European counterparts”.55
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Issue Description and written evidence references Notes
The future of the European 
Medicines Agency in London 
and licensing of new treatments
A particular concern raised in written evidence was the feasibility of the UK being 
able to retain the headquarters of the European Medicines Agency (EMA), and the 
benefits this brings to UK bioscience and pharmaceutical businesses in dealing with 
EU regulation and approvals. In our report on the EU regulation of the life-sciences, 
we highlighted the importance of the close relationship between the EMA and the 
UK Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA).56 If the UK, after 
Brexit, is not a member of the EEA, pharmaceutical companies would need to apply 
for marketing authorisations separately to the Medicines and Healthcare Products 
Regulatory Agency (MHRA) for a medicine they wished to supply in the UK. 
This issue was the subject of a 
Westminster Hall debate on 12 
October.57
Robin Walker MP (a DExEU 
Minister) told us that “The 
implications to medicines 
licensed through the EMA 
after the UK’s departure from 
the EU are being considered as 
part of the wider assessment 
of the UK’s regulatory regime. 
It is too early to speculate 
at this stage on the future 
location of the EMA.”58
43 Babraham Institute (LEA 124)
44 Universities UK (LEA 275) annex 2
45 Institute of Physics (LEA 135) para 3.1
46 Institution of Environmental Sciences (LEA 256) para 7.1
47 British Pharmaceutical Society (LEA 272) para 3. See also Cancer Research UK (LEA 224) and others.
48 UCL (LEA 258) paras 24–25
49 Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute (LEA 133) para 19
50 Open Data Institute (LEA 118)
51 British Toxicology Society (LEA 255) para 12
52 Science and Technology Committee, First Report of Session 2016–17, EU regulation of the life sciences, HC 158, para 65
53 National Farmers’ Union (LEA 116)
54 Royal Society of Biology (LEA 225) para 17
55 Agricultural Biotechnology Council (LEA 191)
56 Science and Technology Committee, First Report of Session 2016–17, EU regulation of the life sciences, HC 158, para 28 ff
57 HC Deb, 12 October 2016, cols 116–137WH
58 Q210
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Table 5: Innovation, facilities and infrastructure
Issue Description and references Notes
The contribution that 
science and research 
can make to the 
industrial strategy
The Campaign for Science and Engineering wrote that “the Industrial Strategy could provide a long-term, 
ambitious framework and programmes to support collaboration, knowledge exchange and build on the UK’s 
competitive strength of its science and innovation base”.59
The Royal Academy of Engineering wrote that “Long-term commitment to an Industrial Strategy is one of the 
most effective ways of encouraging private sector investment in priority sector and technology areas, thus the 
Prime Minister’s commitment to Industrial Strategy was welcomed by the engineering community. An Industrial 
Strategy, if deployed successfully, will help the UK to exploit the opportunities and mitigate many of the risks that 
face the country as a consequence of exiting the EU. The Academy wants to ensure that engineering businesses, 
large and small, feature strongly in the industrial strategy and can access the talented workforce they need. […] 
Furthermore, the creation of UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) offers the opportunity for an agile research and 
innovation system that invests strategically in areas of future growth and brings greater coherence to research 
and innovation funding.
The Business, En-
ergy and Industrial 
Strategy Committee 
is currently holding 
an inquiry into the 
Government’s forth-
coming industrial 
strategy.60
Access to EU facilities Research often needs specialised infrastructure, including equipment and buildings, or less tangible infrastructure 
such as databases, archives, collections and computing systems. Since such facilities can be expensive, investment 
in construction and running costs may be provided by multiple countries. Thus, while the ‘headquarters’ of a 
facility will be in one country, other investor countries in the infrastructure can also gain access. For example, 
the European Synchrotron Radiation Facility (one of the most powerful x-ray sources in the world) is located in 
Grenoble, France. It is funded, however, by 21 partner nations, including the UK via the Science and Technology 
Facilities Council (STFC), who can use the facility. Professor Leyser, representing the Royal Society, also emphasised 
that UK scientists would “want to continue to make use of the facilities that are outside the UK because that is 
how science works and that is the most efficient way to do science. We do not want a situation where we are 
duplicating facilities because we no longer have access to existing facilities”.61
Gareth Davies from BEIS emphasised the complexity of the nature of the scientific community’s relationship with 
Europe:
“Some of the relationships are obviously formal and through the European Union. Others are multilateral 
and predate our relationship with Europe. As you work through the individual research institutions, it is very 
important to discriminate between those different types. There is CERN on the one hand, and JET and ITER, on 
nuclear fusion. There is work on European spallation centres and SKA in Manchester. They all have different 
legal bases and different ways of participation. A very complex and variable geometry sits behind these 
relationships”.62
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Issue Description and references Notes
Participation in space 
projects
Several organisations highlighted the UK’s ability to participate in space and satellite projects that will provide 
national infrastructure. The Satellite Applications Catapult told us that “the EU has more recently been increasing 
the role it plays in European space programmes, especially those which have an application focus, and hence are 
important to the UK. This includes taking leadership of programmes like Galileo [satellite navigation programme] 
and Copernicus [earth monitoring programme], in both of which the UK has strong industrial interest […] The UK 
satellite applications sector needs to retain access to Copernicus and Galileo to drive economic growth through 
the exploitation of these and other data sources. The current EU data and information policy means that users 
have free, full and open access to the data from these programmes. It is important that this continues. Defra, as 
the UK lead for the Copernicus programme, should work to ensure its future access and ideally influence in this 
programme. There are a number of operational contracts that are being, or are due to be, tendered for these 
programmes, the UK Government should ensure that UK companies have fair access to these contracts during the 
exit negotiations, to ensure the benefits of past investments”.63
Hosting EU facilities in 
the UK
The House of Lords Science and Technology Committee highlighted in its report that the UK hosts the 
headquarters of five pan-European research facilities: the European Life-science Infrastructure for Biological 
Information (ELIXIR) in Cambridgeshire, the Integrated Structural Biology Infrastructure (INSTRUCT) in Oxford, 
the Infrastructure for Systems Biology-Europe (ISBE) in London, the Square Kilometre Array at Jodrell Bank, and 
the European Social Survey (ESS ERIC) in London.64
Professor Philip Nelson of Research Councils UK highlighted their importance: “They are important activities. 
Several of them are around biology. We have the European Social Survey, for example, at City University in 
London. That is a very important enterprise, which has over 90,000 registered users worldwide using social survey 
data. It is critically important that we stay involved in that. There will be an awful lot of technical detail to be 
worked through and unravelled in the negotiation process, and in the way these things are structured—again 
emphasising the complexity—it will be important that we have a strong voice at the table to try to ensure that 
we can stay very much part of these things”.65
We received written evidence from the European Social Survey (a European Infrastructure Consortium, 
(ERIC)),66 ELIXIR,67 and others, highlighting the specifics of their circumstances. For instance, the ESS notes that 
“Arrangements have been made for Norway to host an ERIC, suggesting that Associated Members status would 
allow the UK to continue hosting the ESS ERIC. However arrangements which lead to the legal exclusion of the 
UK from the European Research Area—and in particular from access to future framework programme funding—
would have far reaching ramifications for the ability of the UK to act as a host country for any ERIC including the 
ESS”.
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59 Campaign for Science and Engineering (LEA 267)
60 “Industrial strategy inquiry”, Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, accessed 10 November 2016
61 Q76
62 Q206
63 Satellite Applications Catapult (LEA 93). Space programmes such as Galileo and Copernicus were also highlighted by the European Space Agency (LEA 105), ADS Group (LEA 221), Airbus (LEA 
168), 
64 House of Lords, EU membership and UK science, Second report of the Science and Technology Committee, Session 2015–16, HL Paper 127, para 180
65 Q112
66 European Social Survey (LEA 5)
67 ELIXIR (LEA 231)
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